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RETHINKING MANIFEST INJUSTICE:
REFLECTIONS UPON THE DECISIONS OF THE
THREE-JUDGE SENTENCING PANEL
BARRY JEFFREY STERN*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Alaska Legislature adopted presumptive sentencing ten
years ago,1 it recognized that sometimes it would be manifestly unjust
to require the imposition of a presumptive sentence.2 It therefore es-
tablished a "safety valve ' 3 to permit deviation from presumptive sen-
tencing when a panel of three superior court judges agrees with the
trial court that a presumptive sentence would result in manifest injus-
tice either to the state or to a defendant.4
Although the legislature anticipated that some presumptive
sentences would be manifestly unjust, it did not define what makes a
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1. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219 (effective Jan. 1,
1980); see generally Stern, Presumptive Sentencing in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REv. 227
(1985), for a summary of the events leading to the adoption of presumptive sentencing
and a discussion of the major features of presumptive sentencing.
2. In this comment, the term "presumptive sentence" is used to refer to the sen-
tence imposed under the presumptive sentencing statutes after a presumptive term of
imprisonment is adjusted for statutorily prescribed aggravating and mitigating factors.
The term "presumptive term of imprisonment" is used to refer to the sentence re-
quired under presumptive sentencing before adjustment for aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors.
3. The "safety valve" characterization of the three-judge panel appears in
Heathcock v. State, 670 P.2d 1155, 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (Singleton, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
4. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.165-.175 (1984). Although manifest injustice to
the state may result from the imposition of an inappropriately lenient presumptive
sentence, all of the cases decided by the three-judge panel during the period reviewed
in this comment involve trial court findings that manifest injustice would result from
the imposition of an inappropriately severe presumptive sentence. See infra notes 22-
23.
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sentence unjust. Instead, the legislature simply noted two general cat-
egories of cases in which injustice might result: first, cases in which
the trial court is precluded from considering relevant non-statutory
aggravating or mitigating factors in modifying a presumptive term of
imprisonment;5 and, second, cases in which a presumptive term of im-
prisonment, even after adjustment for relevant aggravating and miti-
gating factors, is manifestly unjust.6 Further clarification of what
makes a sentence unjust has been left to the courts.
In Lloyd v. State,7 the Alaska Court of Appeals equated the mani-
fest injustice standard with the concepts of "shocking to the con-
science" and "obvious unfairness." 8 While the court of appeals has
noted that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of presumptive
sentencing for trial courts routinely to find manifest injustice and to
send cases to the panel,9 it has also stated that "where the issue of
manifest injustice appears to be a close one, we would urge sentencing
judges to resolve any doubt in favor of a referral" to the panel.' 0
In State v. Smith, " the Alaska Court of Appeals took a significant
step in interpreting the manifest injustice standard. In that case the
court held that manifest injustice can result from a trial court's inabil-
ity to reduce a presumptive term of imprisonment to account for a
youthful offender's "particularly favorable potential for rehabilita-
tion."' 2 Since Smith, the three-judge panel has increasingly relied
5. Under presumptive sentencing, a trial court may adjust a presumptive term of
imprisonment only for aggravating and mitigating factors specified by the legislature.
See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c), (d) (Supp. 1987). If the trial court imposes a sen-
tence other than the presumptive term of imprisonment without having found aggra-
vating or mitigating factors, it has imposed an illegal sentence that will be vacated on
appeal. See State v. LaPorte, 672 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.165 (1984). See generally Smith v. State, 711 P.2d
561, 568-70 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
7. 672 P.2d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
8. Id. at 154.
9. Walsh v. State, 677 P.2d 912, 919 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
10. Lloyd v. State, 672 P.2d at 155. If a party disagrees with the trial court's
finding on manifest injustice, it may appeal that determination to the court of appeals,
but that court will reverse only "clearly mistaken" decisions. Walsh, 677 P.2d at 918.
11. 711 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
12. Id. at 571-72. Smith, however, did not provide a workable definition of what
factors establish an offender's favorable rehabilitation potential.
In Kirby v. State, No. 767 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987), the court of appeals
subsequently defined rehabilitation potential as "the converse of dangerousness." Id.,
slip op. at 17. The Kirby court concluded that "a person has an unusually good poten-
tial for rehabilitation if the court is satisfied, after reviewing the totality of circum-
stances, that he or she can adequately be treated in the community and need not be
incarcerated for the full presumptive term in order to prevent future criminal activ-
ity." Id. Refining its decision in Smith, the Kirby court also held that a defendant's
youth, although "highly relevant," is not a prerequisite for a finding of rehabilitation
potential. Id. at 13.
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upon a defendant's rehabilitation potential in determining whether
presumptive sentences are manifestly unjust.
Although the Alaska Court of Appeals has articulated general
guidelines clarifying the manifest injustice standard, the trial courts
and three-judge sentencing panel must apply those guidelines. If the
panel disagrees with the trial court's initial finding of manifest injus-
tice, it remands the case to the trial court for the imposition of the
required presumptive sentence. 13 When this happens, the panel ac-
companies its remand order with "a written statement of its findings
and conclusions." 14 In contrast, if the panel concurs with the trial
court's finding of manifest injustice, the panel sentences the defendant
without regard to the presumptive sentence. 15 Moreover, when the
panel imposes a sentence, it is not required to prepare a written sum-
mary or opinion in support of that sentence. 16
In late 1986, the panel published the first summary of its deci-
sions.17 The summary included a review of cases decided between July
and December 1986.18 A second summary, covering cases decided be-
tween January and June 1987, was published in the fall of 1987.19 The
summaries are meant "to give sentencing courts and counsel notice of
13. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(b) (1984).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Prior to this time, the panel did not publish summaries of its decisions, nor
did it keep records of its cases. See letter from David C. Lampen, Clerk of the Appel-
late Courts, to the author (Nov. 25, 1987) [hereinafter Lampen letter] (copy on file
with the Alaska Law Review). Consequently, statistics are unavailable on the number
of cases referred to the panel or the disposition of those cases during the six-and-one-
half years of presumptive sentencing. (Although presumptive sentencing was adopted
in 1978, it did not become effective until January 1, 1980. Act of July 17, 1978, ch.
166, 1978 Sess. Laws 219 (effective Jan. 1, 1980)):
According to the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, the current presiding judge for
the panel, Judge Brian Shortell, eventually hopes to assemble complete statistics about
its sentencing practices:
Judge Shortell indicates that he has been considering trying to have staff
go through some of the closed cases in order to develop a data base that
might be useful for the panel. He would hope to try and categorize the cases
according to offense and offender, and in that way, provide some trend infor-
mation on range of sentences or past rulings by the panel. At this point,
however, this project has not gotten off the ground.
See Lampen letter, supra.
18. ALASKA SUPERIOR COURT, THREE-JUDGE SENTENCING PANEL DECISIONS,
JULY-DECEMBER 1986 [hereinafter 1986 SUMMARY] (accompanying the Alaska Ap-
pellate Courts' Monthly Activity Report for December 1986).
19. ALASKA SUPERIOR COURT, THREE-JUDGE SENTENCING PANEL DECISIONS,
JANUARY-JUNE 1987 [hereinafter 1987 SUMMARY] (accompanying the Alaska Appel-
late Courts' Monthly Activity Report for August 1987).
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pertinent decisions," but the panel emphasized that they "are not in-
tended to be more than capsule summaries."'20 The panel has also cau-
tioned readers that "[f]or a more complete understanding of the
decision, the specific findings and conclusions in the cases listed are
the best source. 2 1
The panel decided thirty-five cases during the twelve months cov-
ered by the two summaries.2 2 Three of those cases were on remand to
the panel following court of appeals decisions finding manifest injus-
tice.2 3 A fourth case was remanded by the panel to the trial court
without the necessity of a panel determination on manifest injustice.2 4
Thus, of the thirty-five decisions summarized by the panel, thirty-one
required the panel to determine whether manifest injustice was pres-
ent, and it is these thirty-one cases that serve as the basis for this
comment.
In twenty-four of the thirty-one cases, or seventy-seven percent of
the decisions, the panel found manifest injustice and imposed
20. 1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. The panel decided the following cases between July and December 1986:
State v. Collins, 3AN-85-4601 Cr.; State v. Dolchok, 3AN-85-5385 Cr.; State v. Hart-
man, 4FAS-86-362 Cr.; State v. Helton, 3KNS-83-818 Cr.; State v. King, 3AN-83-
7949 Cr.; State v. Murphy, 4FA-85-3384 Cr.; State v. New, 3AN-84-4047 Cr.; State v.
Nunley, 3PA-85-1847 Cr.; State v. Piazza, 3AN-85-3970 Cr.; State v. Williams, 4FA-
86-282 Cr.; State v. Wilson, 3ANS-85-6449 Cr. See 1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18,
for summaries of the panel's decisions.
The following cases were decided between January and June 1987: State v. Al-
bert, 4FA-86-983 Cr.; State v. Bennett, 3AN-84-3584 Cr.; State v. Bond, 3AN-85-
1918 Cr.; State v. Brown, 3AN-86-1716 Cr.; State v. Chilton, 3AN-86-4737 Cr.; State
v. Cooper, 3AN-85-8025 Cr.; State v. Davison, 4FA-86-3371 Cr.; State v. Fry, 3AN-
85-6548 Cr.; State v. George, 4FA-86-206 Cr.; State v. Green, 3KN-86-484 Cr.; State
v. Hilburn, 3AN-85-601 Cr.; State v. Humphrey, 3AN-85-8027 Cr.; State v. Hutchin-
son, 3AN-85-8290 Cr.; State v. Kaigelak, 3BA-86-189 Cr.; State v. Kloby, 3AN-86-
690 Cr.; State v. Mandregen, 3AN-85-3804 Cr.; State v. Maxwell, 4FA-86-185 Cr.;
State v. Neal, 3AN-86-3413 Cr.; State v. Newman, 3AN-86-4744 Cr.; State v. Ridge-
way, 3AN-86-7109 Cr.; State v. St. George, 3AN-86-6325 Cr.; State v. St. John, 3AN-
84-894 Cr.; State v. Wickman, 4FA-86-2327 Cr.; State v. Winther, 4FA-86-2458 Cr.
See 1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19, for summaries of the panel's decisions.
23. The three cases remanded by the court of appeals to the panel following court
of appeals decisions finding manifest injustice were Bennett (1987 SUMMARY, supra
note 19) (on remand from Bennett v. State, A-856 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1986));
New (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (on remand from New v. State, 714 P.2d 378
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986)); King (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (on remand from
Smith v. State, 711 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)). The panel's decisions may be
appealed to the court of appeals, which will reverse only "clearly mistaken" decisions.
Shaw v. State, 673 P.2d 781, 786 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). Cf supra note 10 (discuss-
ing appeals from trial court decisions).
24. That case was Wickman (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19).
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sentences less severe than those required by presumptive sentencing.2 5
The following capsule summary illustrates the types of factors that the
panel is likely to consider in making such a finding of manifest
injustice:
State v. James Chilton .... Twenty-one year old defendant with
severe alcohol problem who committed impulsive armed robbery
while drunk. Seven year presumptive term found manifestly unjust
in view of the defendant's youth, amenability to treatment, personal
history, and prospects for rehabilitation. Defendant sentenced to
six years with four suspended (non-presumptive); three years' pro-
bation, [with a] condition [of] no alcohol use and completion of ap-
propriate alcohol therapy program. 26
In eight cases, the panel disagreed with the trial court's determi-
nation of manifest injustice and remanded the case to the trial court
for the imposition of the required presumptive sentence.27 The panel's
capsule summary of State v. Hilburn describes one such case and again
highlights the factors found important by the panel in making its de-
termination that manifest injustice was not present:
State v. Kevin Hilburn .... A twenty-six year old defendant facing
a ten-year presumptive sentence for first degree assault (multiple
rapes accomplished by threatening the victim with a firearm). Trialjudge found this to be a "borderline" case justifying referral to the
panel. The panel found the excellent prior record and history of the
defendant did not justify a finding of manifest injustice as the crime
was brutal and the victim particularly vulnerable, the defendant
clearly needed a substantial jail term to protect the public, and de-
terrence and community condemnation goals of sentencing assumed
priority under all of the circumstances of the case.28
The capsule summaries prepared by the panel provide brief but
valuable insights into the circumstances that now trigger presumptive
sentencing's "safety valve." The summaries, therefore, are likely to be
relied upon by counsel in arguing whether a case should be referred to
the panel, and by trial courts in deciding whether manifest injustice is
present.
25. Albert; Brown; Chilton; Cooper; Davison; Fry; George; Green; Hutchinson;
Humphrey; Kaigelak; Mandregen; Maxwell; Neal; Newman; Ridgeway; St. John; St.
George (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19); Collins; Dolchock; Nunley; Piazza; Williams;
Wilson (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18).
26. Chilton (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (emphasis added).
27. The panel disagreed with the trial court's finding of manifest injustice in the
following cases: Bond; Hilburn; Kloby; Mandregen; Winther (1987 SUMMARY, supra
note 19); Hartman; Helton; Murphy (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18).
The total number of cases referred to in this note and note 25 supra, equals 32,
which is one more case than the 31 decisions reviewed in this comment. The "extra
case" results because one decision, Mandregen, involved two counts and resulted in
panel findings that manifest injustice existed for one count but not for the other. See
Mandregen (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18).
28. Hilburn (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (emphasis added).
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The remainder of this comment discusses several aspects of the
panel's approach to applying the manifest injustice standard by exam-
ining the patterns that emerge from the two published summaries. In
doing so, this comment: (1) proposes that the list of mitigating factors
be expanded to allow trial courts to consider a first felony offender's
lack of prior criminal history in reducing a presumptive term;
(2) questions whether the panel is properly applying the manifest in-
justice standard, particularly in its sentencing of repeat felony offend-
ers; and (3) stresses the need for more comprehensive reporting and
additional analysis of the panel's decisions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. First Felony Offenders: Rehabilitation Potential
Of the twenty-four cases in which the panel found manifest injus-
tice,29 most involved defendants who were first felony offenders. 30 The
29. See supra note 25.
30. The term "first felony offender" is used in this comment to refer to a defend-
ant whose prior criminal history does not include a felony that can be considered for
purposes of repeat felony status under presumptive sentencing. For a discussion of
when an offender qualifies as a repeat felony offender, see Stem, supra note 1, at 239-
45.
Twenty of the panel's decisions involve apparent first offenders - "apparent"
because the panel's summaries, unfortunately, do not always clearly designate the
prior felony status of the defendant. The 20 cases include decisions in which the de-
fendant's status as a first felony offender is specifically mentioned or reasonably im-
plied in the panel's summaries. The cases in this category are: Collins (1986
SUMMARY, supra note 18) (first felony offender status implicit from defendant facing
seven-year sentence for assault in the first degree with a baseball bat, see ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2) (1984)); Dolchok (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (status im-
plicit from defendant facing eight-year sentence for sexual assault in the first degree,
see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(1)); Piazza (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (status
implicit from fact that prior convictions are not mentioned in summary); Williams
(1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (status implicit from panel's reference to defendant's
"excellent prior record"); Wilson (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (status as first fel-
ony offender specifically mentioned); Albert (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status
implicit from defendant apparently facing a mitigated presumptive sentence for as-
sault in the first degree with an axe, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(c)(2),
12.55.155(a)(2) (Supp. 1987)); Bond (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status implicit
from summary's reference to defendant's "clean prior record"); Chilton (1987 SUM-
MARY, supra note 19) (status implicit from defendant facing seven-year sentence for
armed robbery, ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(1)); Cooper (1987 SUMMARY, supra
note 19) (status as first felony offender specifically mentioned); Green (1987 SUM-
MARY, supra note 19) (status implicit from defendant facing eight-year sentence for
sexual assault in the first degree, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (c)(l)); George (1987
SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status implicit from defendant apparently facing five-year
presumptive term of imprisonment for manslaughter, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.125(c)(1)); Humphrey (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status noted by the
panel as similar to Smith and King - the defendants in these cases were first felony
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panel's most frequent justification for deviating from the presumptive
sentence was the factor that established manifest injustice in State v.
Smith:31 a strong potential for rehabilitation. 32 One can argue, how-
ever, that Smith was wrongly decided by the Alaska Court of Appeals
and that a prediction of rehabilitation potential, no matter how strong,
should be insufficient to support a finding of manifest injustice.
In enacting presumptive sentencing, the Alaska Legislature
unambiguously stated that its new sentencing scheme "reflects the
'just desserts' theory of punishment, which holds that justice requires
that a sentence imposed on a defendant should be based on the crime
he committed rather than on speculation as to future behavior. ' 33 A
finding of manifest injustice based upon the defendant's rehabilitation
potential appears, at first glance, to be fundamentally inconsistent with
the philosophy of presumptive sentencing because it requires judges to
speculate on the defendant's future behavior rather than to focus on
the nature of the crime committed.
Rehabilitation potential, however, is not always an irrelevant fac-
tor under presumptive sentencing. Indeed, in its "declaration of pur-
pose" accompanying the enactment of presumptive sentencing, the
legislature directed the courts to assess the likelihood of the defend-
ant's rehabilitation in imposing a sentence. 34 Relying upon that decla-
ration of purpose, the Alaska Court of Appeals in Juneby v. State35
held that rehabilitation potential is an appropriate factor in determin-
ing how much to adjust a presumptive term of imprisonment once a
statutory prescribed mitigating or aggravating factor is established. 36
offenders, see Smith, 711 P.2d at 563); Kaigelak (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (sta-
tus implicit since summary refers to only one prior misdemeanor); Mandregen (1987
SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status specifically mentioned); Neal (1987 SUMMARY,
supra note 19) (status implicit from defendant facing seven-year sentence for assault in
the first degree, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.1259(c)(2)); Newman (1987 SUMMARY,
supra note 19) (status implicit from defendant facing seven-year sentence for shooting
victim, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2)); Ridgeway (1987 SUMMARY, supra note
19) (status specifically mentioned); St. George (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (status
implicit from defendant facing five-year sentence for manslaughter, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.125(c)(1)).
The current difficulty in determining the defendant's prior felony status could be
eliminated easily if the panel included explicit designations in the summaries.
31. 711 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
32. See, e.g., Green (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19); Dolchok (1986 SUMMARY,
supra note 18); Nunley (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18).
33. ALASKA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, ALASKA SENATE J. (SuPP. No. 47) 148 (June
12, 1978) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
34. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005(2) (1984).
35. 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983).
36. Id. at 836 n.26.
19881
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Against the background of the Juneby decision and the legisla-
ture's determination that rehabilitation potential remains an appropri-
ate factor under presumptive sentencing, it seems inconsistent to allow
a trial court to consider rehabilitation potential in deciding how much
to reduce a presumptive term of imprisonment if a statutory mitigat-
ing factor is established, 37 but to preclude it from reducing the sen-
tence for rehabilitation potential if no mitigating factor is
established. 38  Allowing deviations from presumptive sentencing
through a finding of manifest injustice and sentencing by the three-
judge panel is one way to insure that all first felony offenders can have
rehabilitation potential taken into account at sentencing. The problem
with the current approach, however, is that it is time consuming and
precludes the trial courts from considering relevant information in im-
posing sentences.
A preferable alternative to today's burdensome practice in which
a first felony offender's rehabilitation potential can sometimes be con-
sidered solely through a referral to the panel is to enact a mitigating
factor codifying one of the circumstances relied upon in Smith to find
manifest injustice. A first felony committed by an offender with no
prior juvenile or adult arrests or convictions warrants a less severe
sentence when compared to the same crime committed by an offender
with numerous misdemeanor arrests or convictions, as the lack of
prior criminal history is an objective and relevant circumstance upon
which to base a finding of rehabilitation potential.39 Yet, under ex-
isting law, a trial court would have to treat both offenders identically if
37. Id. See also Smith, 711 P.2d at 572 n.8.
38. It should be recalled that a trial court cannot reduce a presumptive term of
imprisonment if no mitigating factors are established. See supra note 5. If manifest
injustice would result from the imposition of the presumptive term, the panel, rather
than the trial court, sentences the defendant. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
39. While this conclusion reflects an element of speculation about the defendant's
future conduct (i.e., that because the defendant has led an otherwise lawful life, it
becomes more likely that the crime is an isolated impulsive violation of the law that is
unlikely to reoccur), such speculation is not necessarily inconsistent with the philoso-
phy of presumptive sentencing. Since presumptive sentencing imposes increasingly
severe sentences based on the number of the defendant's prior felony convictions, an
element of speculation is also implicit in that policy determination: that a recidivist
deserves a more severe sentence and is unlikely to be deterred by a lesser one. The
validity of deterrence as a sentencing consideration was specifically recognized by the
Alaska Legislature when it adopted presumptive sentencing. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.005(5) (1984).
Several sentencing systems recognize that an offender's lack of prior criminal his-
tory is a mitigating factor. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3. l(a)(7)
(Smith-Hurd 1982) ("defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activ-
ity or has led law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of
the present crime"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(7) (West Supp. 1987) (same); N.C.
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neither case presented currently recognized aggravating or mitigating
factors.40 The lack of a prior criminal history is an important factor in
sentencing first felony offenders and should be added to the current
statutory list of mitigating factors.41
An expansion of the list of mitigating factors to account for a first
felony offender's lack of a prior criminal history does not preclude the
trial court and the panel from finding that even a presumptive term of
imprisonment reduced by the statutory maximum amount 42 for that
factor remains manifestly unjust. Indeed, in the overwhelming major-
ity of first felony offender cases in which the panel found manifest
injustice, it imposed sentences substantially less severe than the lowest
authorized mitigated presumptive sentence.43 Most of those cases, it
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(2)(a) (1983) (defendant "has no record of criminal convic-
tions or a record consisting solely of misdemeanors punishable by not more than 60
days' imprisonment").
40. The aggravating factor specified in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(21) (Supp.
1987) can be established in the case of a first felony offender with a long prior misde-
meanor record. That factor, however, requires that the prior misdemeanors be "simi-
lar in nature to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced .... ." Id. The
one possible mitigating factor applicable to the youthful first felony offender requires
the defendant's conduct to have been "substantially influenced by another person
more mature than the defendant." Id. § 12.55.155(d)(4).
41. While one of the circumstances cited in Smith, 711 P.2d 561 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985), justifying a finding of rehabilitation potential, should be added to the list of
mitigating factors, caution should be exercised in adding others.
It will be recalled that the primary purpose of presumptive sentencing was to
eliminate unjustified disparity in Alaska's then existing sentencing practices, disparity
that in some instances was correlated to the race of the defendant. See generally
Stem, supra note 1, at 228-29. In concluding that the defendants in Smith showed
high rehabilitation potential, the court of appeals in part relied upon their "good his-
tory of employment, a favorable background of scholastic and athletic achievement,
strong family ties and continuing family support.... ." 711 P.2d at 570. In consider-
ing whether to add any of these circumstances to the list of mitigating factors, the
legislature must confront the question of whether they would inappropriately and dis-
proportionately apply in the sentencing of caucasian defendants. The factors of edu-
cational and vocational skills, employment record, and family and community ties are
generally irrelevant as sentencing considerations under the federal guideline system.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE
MANUAL, §§ 5HI.2, .5, .6 (1987).
42. A presumptive term of imprisonment of four years or less can be reduced by
the trial court by any amount if mitigating factors are established. ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). A presumptive term of imprisonment of greater than
four years can be reduced to no less than one-half the presumptive term for mitigating
factors. Id. § 12.55.155(a)(2).
43. See, e.g., Collins (1986 SUMMARY, supra note 18) (lowest mitigated presump-
tive sentence was three and one-half years; panel suspended imposition of sentence for
three years on condition that defendant serve one year in jail and successfully com-
plete three years probation); Albert (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (lowest mitigated
presumptive sentence was three and one-half years; panel imposed non-presumptive
sentence of seven years with five suspended and three years probation; the effect of a
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
will be recalled, relied upon the offender's strong potential for rehabili-
tation in finding manifest injustice.44 Thus, even after the enactment
of the proposed mitigating factor, the same cases that now result in
referral to the panel because of the trial court's inability to consider
rehabilitation potential in adjusting a presumptive term may continue
to be referred on the basis that the presumptive sentence, even after
adjusted for the lack of prior criminal history, is manifestly unjust.
The panel's sentencing patterns in first felony offender cases de-
serve careful analysis and scrutiny. If the Alaska Legislature agrees
that the circumstances presented by those cases support the sentences
imposed by the panel, it might consider broadening the discretion of
trial courts to reduce a first felony offender's sentence when mitigating
factors, including rehabilitation potential, are established and thereby
prevent the need for referral to the panel.45 On the other hand, if the
legislature concludes that the panel has misapplied the manifest injus-
tice standard, it might impose a cap on the maximum amount the
panel can reduce a presumptive term46 or remove the panel's jurisdic-
tion in cases in which the trial court can mitigate a presumptive term
of imprisonment. If this latter alternative is adopted, a defendant
would retain the ability to seek reduction of a presumptive sentence
through a sentence appeal. 47
B. Repeat Felony Offenders
In five of its summarized decisions, the panel considered cases
that raised the question of whether it was manifestly unjust to impose
a presumptive sentence upon repeat felony offenders. 48 In four of
those five cases, the panel found manifest injustice and sentenced the
non-presumptive sentence on parole eligibility is discussed infra in the text accompa-
nying notes 50-58); Neal (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (lowest mitigated presump-
tive sentence was three and one-half years; panel suspends imposition of sentence for
five years, conditioned on defendant serving one year in jail and completing a three-
year probationary term).
44. See supra text accompanying note 32.
45. For example, the trial court might be granted the ability to reduce a first
felony offender's presumptive term of imprisonment by 75% for mitigating factors.
Since all presumptive terms of imprisonment for first felony offenders exceed four
years, the maximum reduction now allowed for mitigating factors is 50%. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(c), .155(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
46. For example, the panel could be precluded from imposing a sentence that is
less than 75% of the presumptive term of imprisonment if aggravating factors are
present. Under current law, there are no statutory restrictions on the panel's ability to
reduce a presumptive term of imprisonment once manifest injustice is established.
State v. Price, 730 P.2d 159 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
47. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1984).
48. Those cases were: Brown (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19); Davison (1987
SUMMARY, supra note 19); Fry (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19); Kloby (1987 SUM-
MARY, supra note 19); Maxwell (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19). For a discussion of
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defendant to less than the presumptive term of imprisonment. 49 The
capsule summaries of the four cases highlight the need for more com-
prehensive reporting of the panel's decisions and raise the important
issue of whether the panel is properly applying the manifest injustice
standard in sentencing repeat felony offenders.
Consider, for example, the case of Robert Maxwell, a defendant
convicted of sexual assault in the first degree upon his seven-year-old
stepdaughter.50 Maxwell had two prior felony theft convictions, and,
therefore, as a third felony offender, faced a presumptive term of im-
prisonment of twenty-five years. 51 The trial court mitigated that sen-
tence to twelve and one-half years, found manifest injustice, and
referred the case to the panel.52 The panel then sentenced Maxwell to
a non-presumptive sentence of ten years with five years suspended, cit-
ing Maxwell's "very high rehabilitation potential" and the "unrelated
nature of the two prior felonies," which had occurred six years ear-
lier.53 Missing from the panel's capsule summary, however, was any
discussion of the circumstances of Maxwell's sexual assault. For ex-
ample, the panel failed to state whether the abuse was long-term or the
extent of sexual penetration, although such factors had been cited by
the panel in other sexual assault cases. 54
Because Maxwell's sentence was non-presumptive, he presumably
will be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter of his five-year term
of imprisonment.5 5 If Maxwell had been a first, rather than a third,
felony offender, he would have faced a presumptive term of imprison-
ment of eight years,56 which could only have been reduced to four
years for mitigating factors.57 Moreover, if Maxwell, as a first felony
offender, had been sentenced to a mitigated four-year presumptive sen-
tence, he would not have been eligible for parole.5 8 Thus, the sentence
when an offender qualifies as a repeat felony offender, see Stern, supra note 1, at 239-
45.
49. The only repeat felony offender case in which the panel did not find manifest
injustice was Kloby (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19).
50. Maxwell (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19).
51. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i)(4) (1984).
52. The panel agreed with the trial judge that the defendant's very high rehabilita-
tion potential and the unrelated nature of the two prior felonies made the presumptive
term manifestly unjust. Maxwell (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Fry (1987 SUMMARY, supra note 19) (panel notes that assault which
involved only "slight penile penetration ... was not a part of a pattern of inappropri-
ate sexual conduct.., but a truly single incident .. "); Hutchinson (1987 SUMMARY,
supra note 19) (panel notes that conviction based on isolated act).
55. ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.16.090(a) (1986), 33.16.100(c) (Supp. 1987).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i)(1) (1984).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(b) (1984).
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that Maxwell will actually be required to serve is likely to be substan-
tially less onerous than one served by a first felony offender convicted
of the same crime who receives the lowest authorized mitigated
sentence.
Even assuming that it is manifestly unjust to categorize Maxwell
as a repeat felony offender because of the age and nature of his prior
convictions (a conclusion that appears contrary to legislative intent),5 9
the panel never explained what made Maxwell's current crime, the
sexual assault of his seven-year-old stepdaughter, substantially less se-
rious than other sexual assaults. Nor did the panel cite any justifica-
tion for its conclusion that Maxwell had "very high rehabilitation
potential,"' 60 despite his conviction of one of the most serious felonies
in the criminal code61 and his two prior felony convictions. 62
The panel's failure to explain more thoroughly its decision does
not necessarily mean that it was wrong in imposing the sentence it did
on Maxwell. The summary of that case, however, raises the more
fundamental question of whether the panel's capsule summaries pro-
vide adequate guidance to the trial courts and the bar in determining
the type of circumstances in which manifest injustice may exist. The
panel's recent effort to document and publicize its decisions is un-
doubtedly a substantial improvement over its previous practice.63
Nevertheless, the panel's capsule summaries are only the first step in
apprising the courts, the bar, and the legislature about the work of the
panel. Because the panel's decisions greatly influence manifest injus-
tice determinations by trial courts, and are highly complex in terms of
the particular circumstances raised by the cases, five-to-ten-line sum-
maries are inadequate. The panel should, therefore, be required to
59. As enacted in 1978, a prior felony conviction could not be considered for
purposes of presumptive sentencing "if a period of seven or more years has elapsed
between the date of the defendant's unconditional discharge in the immediately pre-
ceding offense and commission of the present offense." ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.145(a)(1) (1980) (amended 1982). The 1978 enactment also included a miti-
gating factor that a prior felony conviction was of a less serious class than the instant
crime. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(8) (repealed 1982). In 1982, the legislature in-
creased the seven-year limitation period to ten years and eliminated the mitigating
factor that a prior felony conviction was of a less serious class than the instant crime.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1) (1984); Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, § 32, 1982
Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 26.
60. See supra text accompanying note 54.
61. Sexual assault in the first degree is punishable by a maximum term of impris-
onment of 30 years. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (1984). Only the crimes of mur-
der, kidnapping, and misconduct involving controlled substances in the first degree
carry higher maximum sentences. Id. § 12.55.125 (a), (b).
62. See supra text accompanying note 51.
63. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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publish all of its decisions in a more comprehensive memorandum or
in opinion form.
Of course, cases like Maxwell also raise the issue of how the mani-
fest injustice standard should be applied in sentencing repeat felony
offenders. Reliance on a defendant's "high rehabilitation potential" 64
to find a sentence "fundamentally unfair" or "shocking to the con-
science" 65 seems particularly inappropriate when an offender has a
history of felony convictions and the presumptive sentencing system
provides that prior felony convictions are one of the most important
factors in determining sentence length. 66
After closely reviewing the panel's sentencing practices in repeat
felony offender cases, one might conclude that the manifest injustice
standard needs to be defined more precisely. Particularly with this
class of offender, the Alaska Legislature might decide to impose a ceil-
ing on the maximum reduction of a sentence that can be accomplished
by the panel. 67 Additionally, the panel might be precluded from con-
sidering rehabilitation potential in finding a sentence manifestly unjust
if a repeat felon's prior convictions occurred within a specified period
before the current offense.
III. CONCLUSION
The tenth anniversary of the adoption of presumptive sentencing
is a particularly appropriate time to reassess how well Alaska's sen-
tencing system is working. A good starting point for that review is a
thorough analysis of the decisions of the three-judge sentencing panel.
The panel's decisions highlight problems with the existing statutes,
64. See supra text accompanying note 53.
65. See supra text accompanying note 8.
66. It is for this reason that this comment's proposal to enact a mitigating factor
to account for rehabilitation potential is only proposed for first felony offenders. See
supra text accompanying notes 39-41. Maxwell is not the only case in which the panel
relied upon a finding of rehabilitation potential to find manifest injustice in sentencing
a repeat felony offender. In another case, Davison, the panel found "strong evidence
relating to" rehabilitation potential, even though the offender was 27 years old and
already had two prior felony convictions. In that case, the panel sentenced Davison,
who was convicted of misconduct involving weapons in the first degree, to 180 days of
imprisonment, but then suspended imposition of sentence. Davison (1987 SUMMARY,
supra note 19).
The court of appeals has implicitly recognized that a finding that a defendant has
a strong potential for rehabilitation can occur even if the defendant has repeatedly
violated the law. See Kirby v. State, No. 767, slip op. at 18 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 31,
1987) ("If a person, despite a good education, a good job, strong support in the com-
munity, and a loving family consistently commits criminal acts, a judge might well
conclude that these favorable factors do not establish a good potential for rehabilita-
tion.") (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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suggest the need for amendment, and focus attention on whether pre-
sumptive sentencing is being applied consistently with legislative in-
tent. The panel can assist that review by publishing more complete
explanations of its decisions, which would comprehensively describe
the circumstances of the charged offense, the prior criminal history of
the defendant, and the panel's reasons for finding a sentence mani-
festly unjust.
If the Alaska Legislature agrees that the circumstances that now
support panel findings of manifest injustice justify departures from
presumptive sentencing, it should consider broadening the discretion
of the trial courts to permit consideration of those factors without the
necessity of referring the case to a panel. If the legislature disagrees
with aspects of the panel's application of the manifest injustice stan-
dard, it should further clarify that standard to preclude objectionable
panel decisions.
